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JAMES IREDELL: LAWYER, STATESMAN, JUDGE.
1751-1799.
"The character of this excellent man has been too little known.
Similar has been the fate of many other valuable characters in America.
They are too little known to those around them, their modest merits
have been too familiar, perhaps too uniform, to attract particular and
distinguished attention."

James Iredell was born in Lewes, Sussex County, England,
October 5, 1751. His father, Mr. Francis Iredell, a merchant
of Bristol, married Margaret McCulloch. The family were
allied by blood to Sir George Macartney, the Earl of Wigton,
the Fergusons, McCullochs, and, by marriage, to Governor
Lyttleton. Henry McCulloch was connected with the Government of the Province of North Carolina, where he owned large
landed estates. Through the influence of relatives and friends,
James Iredell was appointed Comptroller of the Customs at
Port Roanoke (Edenton). It was said at the time "The office
is genteel, requiring little or no duty, so that he will have time
to apply himself to business; it is worth upwards of one hundred pounds sterling a year."

.

.

.

Iredell appropriated a

large portion of his salary to the support of his father and
mother, thus "illustrating in a forcible manner his filial piety
and generous nature." He sailed for his new home with nothing but his commission and letters of introduction from friends
in England to several gentlemen in Edenton, arriving at the
latter place "near the close of the year 1768." His biographer
(225)
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says of him: "He was then just seventeen years old, at that age
when pleasures are enjoyed with the keenest relish. Frank,
ingenuous, of pleasing appearance, winning manners, and educated in the best schools of England, he was kindly received
and warmly welcomed."
The society of Edenton furnished to Iredell a social circle
of cultured and refined hospitality into which he at once entered.
It is with Iredell's preparation for his work as a lawyer, statesman and judge that we are specially concerned, thus precluding
an entrance into the interesting and charming story of his personal and social life further than illustrates his public career.
Very soon after his arrival he began the study of law with
Mr. Samuel Johnston, a lawyer of learning, a man of deep and
extensive reading, of singular purity of life and patriotic service.
"Every moment of leisure was devoted to his legal studies and
to such intercourse with intelligent gentlemen and cultivated
ladies as was calculated to refine and improve. He was a diligent student; he copied Mr. Johnston's arguments and pleas in
important cases. He read carefully and attentively the textbooks, referring to the authorities quoted, and collecting and
digesting kindred passages from all writers within his reach;
he attended the courts, returned to his chamber and wrote out
arguments of his own, applicable to the cases he had heard
stated."1 A few extracts from his "Journal" will give us a fair
view of the young Comptroller preparing himself for the career
which, all unthought of, awaited him. On August 22, 1770,
he writes: "Indolence in any .is
shameful, but in a young man
quite inexcusable. Let me consider for a.moment whether it
will be worth my while to attempt making a figure in life, or
whether I will be content with mediocrity of fame and circumstances.

.

.

.

But nothing is to be acquired without in-

dustry; and indolence is an effectual bar to improvement. .
I have not done as much as I ought to have done; read a little
in Lyttleton's Tenures and stopped in the middle of his Chapter
'The writer has, for his information, relied largely on McRee's "Life
and Correspondence of James Iredell." Except as otherwise indicated quotations herein given, are taken from it.
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on Rents; whereas I ought to have gone through it; it would
have been better than losing three or four games at billiards.
N. B.-If you do play billiards make it a rule not to lengthen."
We learn from his journal that, while studying Lyttleton,
he did not neglect polite literature. "I have been reading a
volume of the Spectator, which is ever new, ever instructive,
ever interesting. I hope they will be transmitted, with honor,
to the latest ages.

.

.

.

Strength of reason, elegance of

style, delicacy of sentiment, fertility of imagination, poignancy
of wit, politeness of manners, and the most amiable pattern of
human life appears through the whole, in so conspicuous a manner, as at once to improve and delight.

.

.

.

Resumed my

Spectator; read a great many entertaining and improving things,
particularly Mr. Addison's Discourses on Fame, in the fourth
volume, which are incomparably elegant and sublime. Surely
the writings of such great, learned and good men are more than
a counterpoise to the libertine writings of professed Deists,
whose immoral lives made them dread an encounter hereafter."
He continues in this strain of reflection regarding the infidelity
so prevalent at that time, concluding with these words, which
are of special interest, giving expression to a principle which
controlled his private and public conduct throughout his life:
"At a time when licentiousness is at an amazing and dangerous
height, we shall be careful to guard against popular prejudice,
though we must not blindly oppose the public voice because it
may appear too tumultuous. Let us do things impartially and
not oppose, or condemn any conduct on the whole on account of
a few improper circumstances attending it."
He was a diligent student of the "Tenures." On July 31,
1771, he writes his father, "I am too often troubling you, but
I will hope for your excuse of this last request, as it will be of
particular, perhaps necessary, service for me. It is that you
will be so obliging as to procure Dr. Blackstone's Commentaries
on the Laws of England and send them by the first opportunity.
I have, indeed, read them by the favor of Mr. Johnston, who
lent them to me, but it is proper that I should read them frequently and with great attention. They are books admirably
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suited for a young student, and indeed may interest the most
learned. The law, there, is not nIerely considered as a profession, but a science. The principles are deduced from their
source and we are not only taught, in the clearest manner, the
general rules of law, but the reasons upon which they are
founded.

.

.

.

Pleasure and instruction go hand in hand,

and we apply to a science, difficult, indeed, at best, with less
reluctance, when by a well-directed application we may hope
to understand it with method and satisfaction. I would take
leave to add one more desire that you would be lleased to send
me The Tatlers and Guardians-the Spectators I have, and these,
with the others, will afford me agreeable desultory reading."
Mr. Iredell received, December 14, 1770, from Governor
Tryon a license to practice law in all the inferior courts of the
Province. On the 26th of November, 177, he was licensed
by Governor Martin to practice in the Superior Courts and
duly qualified at the April Term, 1772. During the intervening year, "with healthy but vehement ambition," he prosecuted
his studies and regularly attended the courts. "Books he had
not, save a volume or two stuffed into his saddle bag with a
scanty supply of apparel.

.

.

.

Iredell early fixed his eyes

upon the glittering heights of his profession and so self-assured
was he of his capacity and industry that he never faltered in
his purpose-he was resolute to win; and with such men to
resolve is to compel success. If unemployed in the Court House
he peopled his chambers with judge, jury and spectators, he
argued cases before his imaginary court and reported his own
arguments."
The journal, during this year, leaves the reader in doubt
whether he was more assiduous in his devotions to Miss Hannah
Johnston or to the great Commentator. That he wooed both
successfully is evidenced by the fact that on January 18,
1773, he was united in marriage to this estimable lady who "supplemented what he needed. . . . She was his constant monitor, adviser, banker and trusted friend. . . . Their lives,

united in one stream, flowed onward softly and gently." Their
correspondence when, because he was engaged in the practice
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of his profession, and, later, in the discharge of his high official
duties, they were separated, is both interesting and instructive.
I-edell's grandfather was a clergyman of the Church of England.
His early religious training and his associations impressed their
influence upon his mind and character. He was given to religious
contemplation, often writing "reflections" upon religious subjects quite remarkable for a young man of eighteen. Within
a year after coming to Edenton he writes down his Sunday
"thoughts," concluding, "I am not ashamed to think seriously of
religion, and hope no example will induce me to treat it with
indifference."
The disputes between the Royal Governors and the people
in North Carolina began at an early day. They continued to
grow in number and intensity. Though a King's officer, Iredell
soon became imbued with the views of the American leaders;
felt that his future was identified with their future, and determined to participate in their defeat or success, to share in their
disgrace or glory. He soon formed intimacies with the leading
men of the Province, men whose thoughts were to irradiate subsequent darkness, and whose voices were destined to cheer and
sustain the people in the hour of disaster. Ere long he began
with them an active correspondence, and his part was so well
supported that a learned gentleman and most competent judge
writes: "He was the letter writer of the war. He had no equal
amongst his cotemporaries."
As early as September, 1773, he published his first political
essay, saying, among other things, "I have always been taught
and, till I am better informed, must continue to believe, that
the Constitution of this country is founded on the Provincial
Charter, which may well be considered the original contract
between the King and the inhabitants." "In the quiet retreat
of his study, with nought to stimulate but the promptings of his
own honest heart, and, perchance, the smile of his noble wife,
with patient toil, Iredell forged and polished the weapons of
debate; if others fixed his mark he recked not who claimed the
honor of the cast."
Mr. Iredell, at this time, began a correspondence with Wil-
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liam Hooper, discussing the questions then engaging the attention of thoughtful men. On April 26, 1774, Hooper writes him,
"Every man who thinks with candor is indebted to you for the
share you have taken in this interesting controversy.
You have discussed dry truths with the most pleasing language,
and have not parted with the most refined delicacy of manners
in the warmth of the contest.

.

.

.

I am happy, dear sir, that

my conduct in public life has met your approbation. It is a
suffrage from a man who has wisdom to distinguish, and too
much virtue to flatter.

.

.

.

Whilst I was active in contest,

you forged the weapons which were to give success to the cause
"
which I supported.
The first Provincial Congress "called by the people themselves," in defiance of the threats of the Royal- Governor, met
in New Bern, August 25, 1774.

Iredell's friends, Johnston,

Hewes, Thomas Jones and Hooper were conspicuous members.
John Harvey was "Moderator." The first of Iredell's political
efforts which have been preserved was addressed to "The Inhabitants of Great Britain." "The Address" is set- out in full in
"McRee's Life and Correspondence," and contains an able and
elaborate statement and defence of the cause of the Americanstracing the history of their first coming and settling-the provisions of their charters and the violations of them by the King
and his Parliament. Iredell, soon thereafter, settled his accounts
and closed his career as Collector, to which position he had been
promoted. After the 4th of July, 1776, he was deeply interested in regard to the form of Government to be adopted by
the State. During these years Iredell had attended the courts,
when open, and had given diligent attention to the practice of his
profession. After the adoption of the Constitution (November,
1776) and the inauguration of a State Government, a judicial
system was established-"Iredell drawing the first court law."
At the session of the Assembly, November, 1777, the State was
laid off into three districts, and Samuel Ashe, Samuel Spencer and
James Iredell were appointed judges. The appointment of Iredell was brought about by William Iooper, who writes, 23rd
of December, 1777, "Before this reaches you, you will have
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received the information of being promoted to the first honors
the State can bestow. . . . You will be at a loss to conjecture how I could have been accessory to this step, after you
had been so explicit to me on the subject. Be assured that I
was not inattentive to your objections, nor did I fail to mention
them and urge them with sincerity to every person who mentioned you for the office to which you are now designated.
I expostulated with them upon the impropriety of electing one who, in all probability might decline, and leave-one of the
seats of justice vacant. . . . Their reasoning prevailed and
you have now the satisfaction of an unrestricted choice. The appointment has been imposed upon you, and therefore you are at
perfect liberty to act or not." Archibald Maclaine wrote: "I
can only say that if it would answer your purposes as fully as
it would please your friends and the public, it would give me
real satisfaction." When it is remembered that, at this time,
Iredell was twenty-seven years old, that only ten years prior
thereto he had come to the State unknown, without any ties
of family or other influences, his election, unsought and against
his inclination, to the highest judicial position in the State, makes
manifest that, by his personal conduct and character, as well as
his learning and ability, he had strongly impressed himself upon
the people and their representative men. William Hooper was
a lawyer of learning and experience, as were other members of
the Assembly. Maclaine, a member of the Assembly, expressed
the opinion of his associates: "However arduous the task you
have undertaken, we have the most hopes from your judgment
and integrity, and these hopes are strengthened by your diffidence.
The members of the Assembly, in appointing .you,
thought, with great reason, that they effectually served themselves and their constituents. As to myself, I confess I was
actuated by duty to the public, having been taught that your
promotion would more effectually serve them than you."
Iredell accepted the judgeship at much sacrifice, financially, and to his personal comfort. He rode one Circuit--during which his letters to his wife give an interesting account of
the country through which he traveled, going as far west as
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Salisbury, and the experience of a judge "on Circuit" at that
early period. On June i6, 1778, he' sent his resignation to the
Governor, who accepted it "with much reluctance, as you can
well conceive, well knowing your place can not be supplied by,
a gentleman of equal ability and inclination to serve the State."
He continued the practice of the law until, on July 8, 1779,
he was tendered and accepted the position of Attorney General,
Hooper writes, expressing pleasure that he had consented to
accept, saying: "I have the happiness to assure you that the
leading characters in this part of the country (Capd Fear) speak
of you as a capital acquisition to our courts, and exult that there
is a prospect of offenders being brought to due punishment without the passions of party or the prejudice of individuals swaying the prosecution." Iredell traveled the Circuit, attending
the courts in the discharge of his duties, receiving a large share
of civil business. His letters to Mrs. Iredell give an interesting
and often amusing account of his experiences. Iredell resigned
his office in 1781. Writing to his brother, Rev. Arthur Iredell, July, 1783; he says: "Since then I have been only a private
lawyer, but with a show of business very near equal to any
lawyers in the country."
After the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and the withdrawal of troops from the State, the people began the work of
-restoring their fortunes and enacting laws suited to their new
political condition. Differences, more or less fundamental, which
had manifested themselves during the war, became more radical-dividing the leaders into parties. Iredell concurred with the
conservatives, Johnston, Hooper, Maclaine, Davie, Spaight and
others, in opposition to Williela Jones, Thomas Person; Samuel
Spencer and their associates. The former insisted that the State
should carry out in good faith the terms of the Treaty, and adopt
such measures as were necessary for that purpose-enforce contracts and maintain a strong Government. While Iredell neither
held nor sought any public position, he was in touch, through
correspondence and otherwise, with those with whom he was in
agreement in opinion. He prosecuted the practice of his pro'aPronounced as if spelled Wylie.
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fession with industry and success, ranking easily with the leaders
of the bar. The more radical sentiment in the State was disposed to magnify the power of the Legislature and oppose any
restriction upon it by the enforcement of constitutional limitations, especially by the courts. In an address to the public, Iredell set forth his views regarding the enforcement of constitutional limitations upon the Legislature. Referring to the convention (November, 1776), which formed the Constitution, he
says: "It was of course to be considered how to impose restrictions on the Legislature, that might still leave it free to all
useful purposes, but at the same time guard against the abuse
of unlimited power, which was not to be trusted without the
most imminent danger, to any man or body of men on earth.
We had not only been sickened and disgusted for years with
the high and almost impious language from Great Britain, of
the omnipotent power of the British Parliament, but had severely
smarted under the effects. We felt, in all its rigor, the mischiefs
of an absolute and unbounded authority, claimed by so weak a
creature as man, and should have been guilty of the basest breach
of trust, as well as the grossest folly, if in the same moment,
when we spurned at the insolent despotism of Great Britain,
we had established a despotic power among ourselves.
I have no doubt but that the power of the Assembly is limited
and defined by the Constitution. It is a creature of the Constitution. . . . These are consequences that seem so natural,
and indeed so irresistible, that I do not observe that they have
been much contested. The great argument is, that, although the
Assembly have not a right to violate the Constitution, yet if
they in fact do so the only remedy is, either by a humble petition that the law may be repealed, or a universal resistance of
the people. But in the meantime their act, whatever it is, is to be
obeyed as a law; for the judicial power is not to presume to question the power of an Act of Assembly." He proceeds, with
remarkable clearness and force, to give expression to the line
of thought which has since been pursued by the courts, both
State and Federal, upon this much-discussed and ever present
question. It must be remembered that this argument
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was written before any court had held that it was within the
power and therefore the duty of the judiciary to refuse to enforce
statutes passed in violation of constitutional limitations. The
question had been mooted and, Tn a few cases passed upon, prior
to the date of Iredell's argument (786), but had not been published beyond the jurisdiction in which they were decided.lb
Richard Dobbs Spaight, while a member of the convention at
Philadelphia (August 12, 1787), in a letter to Iredell, refers
with disapproval to the action of the judges in holding an act
depriving litigants of trial by jury2 unconstitutional. On August
26, 1787, Iredell answered Spaight's letter at length, saying:
"In regard to the late decision at New Bern, I confess it has
ever been my opinion that an act inconsistent with the Constitution was void; and that the judges, consistently with their
duties, could not carry it into effect. The Constitution appears
to me to be a fundamental law, limiting the powers of the Legislature, and with which every existence of those powers must
be compared." After answering other objections advanced by
Spaight, he meets his apprehension that the power will be abused,
saying: "If you had seen, as I did, with what infinite reluctance
the judges came to this decision, what pains they took by proposing expedients to obviate its necessity, you would have seen
in a strong light how little probable it is a judge would ever
give such a judgment when he thought he could possibly avoid
it. But whatever may be the consequences, formed as our Constitution is, I can not help thinking they are not at liberty to
choose, but must in all questionable instances decide upon it. It
is a subject indeed of great magnitude, and I heartily lament
the occasion for its discussion. In all doubtful cases, to be
sure the act ought to be supported: it should be unconstitutional
beyond dispute before it is pronounced such."
The convention at Philadelphia, having submitted the new
Constitution to the Legislatures of the States, Iredell at once
entered upon the task of securing its adoption by the people of
'b Haines: "Conflict over Judicial Power," p. 30;
Studies in Political Science, Vol: XXXV, No. I.
'Bayard v. Singleton, i Martin, 42.

Columbia University
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North Carolina. In no State was the opposition more pronounced or determined. 'The popular leaders of the dominant
party were active in their opposition, one of the most prominent
declaring that "Washington was a d-n rascal and traitor to
his country for putting his hand to such an infamous paper as
the new Constitution." Another, said to have been the most
popular leader in the State, seriously insisted in the convention upon rejecting it without any discussion, saying that he
had made up his mind and was sure that others had done so.
"Of all those who were most active in pressing upon the people
the adoption of the Constitution, Mr. Iredell was undoubtedly
the most able and energetic." 3
At the session of the Legislature, November, 1787, Mr.
Johnston was elected Governor and Mr. Iredell a member of the
Council-he was also appointed a commissioner to revise and
collect the Acts of the General Assembly then in force. A convention of the people was called to meet at Hillsborough, composed of delegates from the several counties and the borough
towns. Iredell was elected from Edenton. On January 8, 1788,
he published a pamphlet, entitled "Answer to Mr. Mason's
Objections to the New Constitution Recommended by the Late
Convention at Philadelphia," by "Marcus."
He stated each
of Mr. Mason's "objections" in their order and in the same
order sets out his "answer." It is not within the scope of this
sketch to undertake a review of Mr. Iredell's "answer" to the
celebrated paper of Mr. George Mason. The pamphlet made
a favorable impression, and strongly affected Iredell's future
career. The correspondence between Iredell and William Hooper,
William R. Davie and Maclaine furnishes an interesting view
of the condition of public sentiment in the State in regard to
the new Constitution. Davie and Spaight, delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, and Maclaine, Samuel Johnston, and John
Steele, Judge Spencer, Willie Jones, Dr. Caldwell, McDowell,
were among the ablest delegates,- who, together with Iredell, represented the conflicting opinions in the convention which met
June 21, 1788. The debates were conducted with ability and
1

McRee, Vol. I, 184.
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dignity and, at times, with much asperity. While Davie, Spaight,
McLaine and Johnston bore their shafe, Iredell was the acknowledged leader for ratification. The proceedings of the convention are published in Elliott's Debates. The opposition could
not be overcome and, on the final vote, the Constitution was
rejected by a vote of 184 to 84. While Iredell was defeated,
he made many friends and advanced his reputation in the State.
The requisite number of States having ratified the Constitution,
the new Government was organized April 30, 1789, North Carolina taking no part, but remaining a free sovereign, independent
State.
It appears from the letters of the Honorable Pierce Butler,
Senator from South Carolina, who writes from New York
August 1i, 1789, that Iredell's reputation had extended beyond
the borders of the State. "The Southern interest calls aloud
for some such men as Mr. Iredell to represent it-to do it justice." Dr. Hugh Williamson writes at the same time, "The
North Carolina debates are considerably read in this State [New
York] especially by Congress members; some of whom, who
formally had little knowledge of the citizens of North Carolina,
have lately been very minute in their enquiries concerning Mr.
Iredell. By the way, I have lately been asked by a Senator
whether I thought you would accept a judge's place under the new
Government if it required your moving out of the State, as we
are not in the Union." A second convention met at Fayetteville
November 2, 1789. Iredell was not a candidate for election as a
delegate. With but little debate the Constitution was ratified
and amendments proposed. A bill was passed establishing a
University, the names of Samuel Johnston and James Iredell
4
being placed at the head of the list of Trustees.
Maclaine writes Iredell December 9, 1789: "What would
you think of being the district judge?"

On February

1o, 179 o ,

without solicitation on his part, Mr. Iredell was nominated by'
President Washington, and unanimously confirmed by the Senate,
one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States. He was just thirty-nine years old. "It is said that Wash"Battle's History of the University, 821.
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ington derived his conviction of Iredell's merits from a perusal of
the debates in the North Carolina Convention and the famous
reply to George Mason's objections." 5 Butler wrote Iredell, February ioth: "I should have been happy to have had you in
Congress. The Union will no longer be deprived of your aid and
the benefit of your abilities.

.

.

.

I congratulate the States

on the appointment and you on this mark of their well-merited
opinion of you." Iredell, acknowledging the letter from the President with his commission, writes: "In accepting this dignified
trust, I do it with all the diffidence becoming the humble abilities I possess; but, at the same time, with the most earnest
resolution to endeavor by unremitting application a faithful discharge of all of its duties in the best manner in my power."
Judge Iredell was assigned to the Southern Circuit and entered
upon his work immediately.
A suit was instituted, at this time, in the State Court against
Iredell and his co-executor upon a bond given by their testator
to a British subject. His co-executor pleaded the "Confiscation Act," in which Iredell refused to join. By direction of
Justices Wilson, Blair and Rutledge a writ of certiorari was issusd
to the State Court, which the judges refused to obey. As an
indication of the hostility to the new Government in the State,
the General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that "The
General Assembly do commend and approve of the conduct of
the judges of the Courts of Law and Courts of Equity in this
particular." 6 At the same session the House of Commons, by
a vote of 25 to 55, refused to adopt a resolution requiring the
Governor and other State officials to take an oath "to support
the Constitution of the United States."
At the April Term, 1792, of the Circuit Court at Savannah,
Judge Iredell delivered a charge to the grand jury which so
impressed the members, that they unanimously requested its publication. A number of his "charges" in other circuits were published at the request of the jury. At the June Term, 1792, at
the Circuit Court at Raleigh, N. C., Judge Iredell, with Dis'Carson's History of the Supreme Court, 155.
6State Record, 44I; 865; io8o; io82.
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trict Judge Sitgreaves, was confronted with a delicate question.
Congress had enacted a statute directing that the invalid pension claims of widows and orphans should be exhibited to the
Circuit Courts; that those to whom the court granted certificates
should be placed on the pension list, subject to the review of
the Secretary of War. Conceiving that the duties thus imposed
were not judicial in their character, and therefore not authorized by the Constitution, which carefully separated the powers
and duties of each department of the Government, Judge Iredell prepared a remonstrance, addressed to the President, in
which he said: "We beg leave to premise, that it is as much
our inclination as it is our duty, to receive with all possible
respect every act of the Legislature, and that we never can find
ourselves in a more painful situation than to be obliged to object to
the execution of any, more especially to the execution of one
founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which
the actual question undoubtedly is. But however lamentable a difference really may be

we are under the indispensable

necessity of acting according to the best dictates of our own
judgment." He therefore set forth at length the reasons by
which he had been brought to the conclusion that he could not,
with proper regard to his duty, execute this statute, concluding,
"The high respect we entertain for the Legislature, our feel'ings as men for persons whose situation requires the earliest,
as well as the most effectual relief, and our sincere desire to
promote, whether officially or otherwise, the just and benevolent
views of Congress, so conspicuous on this, as well as on many
other occasions, have induced us to reflect, whether we could be
justified in acting under this act personally in the character of
Commissioners during the session of a court; and could we be
satisfied that we had authority to do so we would cheerfully
devote such part of our time as might be necessary for the performance of the service." The other justices addressed similar
letters to the President. Congress soon thereafter "made other
provisions for the relief of pensioners." Judge Iredell, until the
act was repealed, heard a large number of petitions as Commissioner. He writes Mrs. Iredell from Hartford, Connecticut,
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September 30, 1792: "We have a great deal of business to do

here, particularly as I have reconciled myself to the propriety of
doing the invalid business out of court." In United States v.
Ferreria, 7 Chief justice Taney says of the action of the court:
"The repeal of the act clearly shows that the President and Congress acquiesced in the correctness of the decision that it was
not a judicial power." 8
Following the refusal to permit Georgia to intervene in the
Brailsford Case in the Circuit Courts the State filed a bill in
equity in the Supreme Court, alleging that the title to the bond,
upon which the action in the Circuit Court was brought was by
virtue of an act passed during the war, confiscating and sequestrating the property and debts of British subjects, in the State.
The court was asked to enjoin the plaintiffs from proceeding,
etc. Each of the judges wrote opinions. Iredell observed that
he had sat in the Circuit Court and refused the motion of the
State to intervene. He said that the court could not with propriety, sustain the application of Georgia, because whenever a
State is a party, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
of the suit. The State, therefore, did not have a complete and
adequate remedy at law. "Every principle of law, justice and
honor, however, seem to require, that the claim of the State
of Georgia should not be indirectly decided or defeated by a
judgment pronounced between parties over whom she had no
control, and upon a trial in which she was not allowed to be
heard." He was of the opinion that an injunction should be
awarded to stay the money in the hands of the marshal until
the court made further orders, etc. The court was divided in
opinion, the majority holding that an injunction should issue
until the hearing. At the February Term, 1793, a motion was
made by Randolph to dissolve the injunction; Iredell was of the
opinion that the motion should be denied. He held, that for
several reasons, the State could not sue on the bond at law,
asking: "How is she to obtain possession of the instrument
without the aid of a court of equity ?"-pointing out the prac113 Howard, 5.
' See n6te to Ferraria's Case,

13 How. 52.
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tical difficulties which she would encounter in securing the bond.
To the suggestions that the State could bring an action of assumpsit for money had and received against Brailsford, which
he termed "the legal panacea of modern times"-he conclusively
answers that while the action "may be beneficially applied to a
great variety of cases, it cannot be pretended that this form of
action will lie before the defendant has actually received the
money"-and this Brailsford had not done. He suggests that
the injunction be continued, and an issue be tried at the bar to
ascertain whether the State of Georgia or Brail~ford was the
true owner. Although a majority of the judges were of the
opinion that the State had an adequate remedy at law, the course
suggested by Iredell was substantially pursued. At the February
Term, 1794, an amicable issue was submitted to a special jury.
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 9 standing alone, Iredell enunciated
and, with a wealth of learning and "arsenal of argument," maintained the position that a State could not be " haled into court"
6y a citizen of another State. The question arose upon an action
of assumpsit instituted in the Supreme Court against the State
of Georgia, process being served upon the Governor and the
Attorney-General. The State refused to enter an appearance,
but filed a remonstrance and protest against the jurisdiction.
The Attorney-General, Randolph, representing the plaintiff,
*lodged a motion that, unless the State entered an appearance and
showed cause to the contrary by a day named, judgment by
default and enquiry be entered, etc. This motion was argued by
Randolph, the State not being represented. Each of the justices
filed opinions. Iredell first analyzed the provisions of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction upon the court in controversies
wherein a State was a party. He quotes the language of the
Judiciary Act distributing the jurisdiction in such cases. He
dwells, somewhat, on the meaning which should be given to the
word "controversies" in the Constitution, with the suggestion
that the use of this word indicated a purpose to so restrict the
causes in which jurisdiction was conferred as to exclude actions
at law for the recovery of money. He proceeds to consider the
92 Dallas, 419.
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question whether it is necessary for Congress to prescribe a
method of procedure in controversies wherein the State is a
party. He argues that, while the judicial department of the
government is established by the Constitution, the Congress
must legislate in respect to the number of the judges, the organization of the Supreme and such inferior courts as may be
established, etc. He quotes the I4th Section of the Judiciary
Act, in which power is conferred upon the courts to issue writs
of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise
of their respective jurisdictions and "agreeable to the principles
and usages of law"-noting the fact that "neither in the State,
now in question, nor in any other in the Union any particular
legislation authorizing a compulsory suit for the recovery of
money against a State was in being, either when the Constitution was adopted or at the time when the Judicial Act was
passed," and concludes that any principles of the common law,
a law which is the ground work of the laws in every State in
the Union, and which, so far as it is applicable to the peculiar
circumstances of the country, and when no special act of legislation controls it, is in force in such State, as it existed in England
at the time of the first settlement of this country; that no other
part of the common law of England can have any reference to
the subject, but that which prescribes remedies against the Crown.
Thus he is brought to the decision of the real question in the
case. It is manifest that, if, until Congress has prescribed some
mode of procedure by which, in controversies wherein the State
is a party, the court must proceed by a mode "agreeable to the
principles and usages of law," and to find such principles and
usages, resort must be had to the common law, the question
necessarily arises whether the States of the Union, when sued,
are to be proceeded against in the same manner as, by the common
law, is prescribed for proceeding against the Sovereign. It is
just at this point that the line of thought between Iredell and
Wilson divides. The former says: "Every State in'the Union,
in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to
the United States, I consider to be as completely sovereign as
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the- United States in respect to the powers surrendered; each
State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved.
It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no
claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered
to them: of course, the powers not surrendered must remain as
they did before.

.

.

.

So far as the States, under the Con-

stitution, can be made legally liable to this authority, so far, to
be sure, they are subordinate to the authority of the United
States, and their individual sovereignty is in this respect limited.
But it is limited no further than the necessary execution of such
authority requires." It will be observed that Iredell is not, at
this point in the argument, discussing the question, whether it is
within the power of Congress to prescribe a mode of procedure
for bringing a State into the Federal Court to answer for a money
demand by a citizen of another State. The argument is that,
until it has done so, the only method of proceeding against a
State is that prescribed by the common law for proceeding
against the sovereign. It therefore becomes necessary to follow
the argument and establish the proposition that, prior to the
formation and ratification of the Constitution, each State was a
sovereign, and that in ratifying the Constitution it did not part,
in respect to the mode of proceeding against it in a controversy
in the Federal Courts, with its sovereignty. He proceeds to give
an interesting history of the method of procedure at the common
law against the King. The history of this branch of the law in
England, although very interesting, has no permanent interest
to the student of American Constitutional law. He thus concludes this branch of the discussion: "I have now, I think, established the following propositions: ist. That the court's action,
so far as it affects the judicial authority, can only be carried
into effect by acts of the Legislature, appointing courts and prescribing their method of procedure. 2nd. That Congress has
provided no new law, but expressly referred us to the old. 3rd.
That there are no principles of the old law to which we must have
recourse that, in any measure, authorizes the present suit, either
by precedent or analogy."
This conclusion was sufficient, from Iredell's point of view,
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to dispose of the case before the court, but Judge Wilson, who
wrote the principal opinion for the majority, threw down the
gauntlet and challenged the basic proposition upon which Iredell's
argument was founded. Here we find laid down the line of
cleavage between the two schools of thought upon the fundamental conception of the relations which the States bore to the
Federal Government. Iredell was a Federalist, Wilson a Nationalist. Wilson opened his opinion with these words. "This is a
case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is a
State, certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined is, whether this State, so respectable, and
whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction df the
Supreme Court of the United States? This question, important
in itself, will depend on others, more important still: nay, and,
perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one no less radical than
this-do the people of the United States form a nation?" Iredell
was not a man to conceal or fail to express his opinions when
either propriety or duty demanded their expression. Meeting his
associate upon the "nmain question," he says: "So far as this
great question affects the Constitution itself, if the present
afforded, consistently with the particular grounds of my opinion,
a proper occasion for a decision upon it, I should not shrink
from its discussion. But it is of extreme moment that no judge
should rashly commit himself upon important questions, which
it is unnecessary for him to decide. My opinion being that even
if the Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a power,
a new law is necessary for the purpose, since no part of the
existing law applies; this alone is sufficient to justify my determination in the present case. So much, however, has been said
on the Constitution that it may not be improper to intimate that
my present opinion is strongly against any construction of it
which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit
against the State for the recovery of money. I think every
word in the Constitution may have its full effect without involving this consequence, and that nothing but express words or an
insurmountable implication (neither of which I consider can be
found in this case) would authorize the deduction of so high a
power."2
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It is not within the purpose or scope of this sketch to enter
into any discussion of the merits of the great question involved
in this battle of the giants or of the manner in which they sustained their conclusions. It is, however, a part of the history
of the controversy, and of the times, that two days after the
opinion was filed, sustaining the jurisdiction, by a majority of
the court, the Eleventh Amendment was introduced into Congress. It is significant that the language of the Amendment is
declaratory of what, in the opinion of Congress, was the correct
construction of the Constitution. It was essentially a reversal
of the decision of the court and writing into the Constitution
the dissenting opinion of Justice Iredell. "It was proposed by
Mr. Sedgwick, a representative from Massachusetts, but was
passed as amended in the Senate by Mr. Gallatin." 10 The words
are: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit, in law or equity, commenced or
proceeded against one of the United States by citizens of another
State or by citizens or subjects of foreign states." It is a singular
fact that, although Hamilton, in the Federalist, and Marshall and
Madison in the Virginia Convention had expressed the opinion
maintained by Iredell, neither he nor either of the other justices
referred to such opinions. Mr. Carson, writing of the opinion
of the court in Chisholm's case, says: "From these views
Iredell, alone, dissented in an able opinion of which it has been
said that it enunciated, either directly or by implication, all the
leading principles which have since become known as State
Rights Doctrine and which as a mere legal argument was far
superior in clearness of reasoning to Wilson or Jay. He confined
himself strictly to the question before the court, whether an action
of assumpsit would lie against a State."
"The rough substance of my argument in the suit against
the State of Georgia," bearing date "February i8, 1793," as
penned by the author is before me. The writing is neat, the
headings carefully arranged, and a few erasures-interlineations
-show care and caution in the form of expression. The argu"Watson's Const. 1535.
"History of the Supreme Court, 174.
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ment covers twenty-three pages-the paper is well preserved
and the ink fresh. The concluding words are: "This opinion, I
hold, however, with all the reserve proper for one which, according to my sentiments in the case, may be deemed in some measure
extra-judicial. With regard to the policy of maintaining such
suits, that is not for this court to consider, unless the point in all
other respects was very doubtful. Policy then might be argued
from with a view to preponderate the judgment. Upon the
question before us I have no doubt. I have therefore nothing to
do with the policy. But I confess, if I was at liberty to speak on
that subject, my opinion on the policy of the case would also
differ from that of the Attorney-General. It is, however, a
delicate topic. I pray to God that if the Attorney-General's
doctrine as to the law be established by the judgment of this
court, all the good he predicts of it may take place and none of
the evils with which, I have the concern to say, it appears to me
to be pregnant." Of this opinion, Mr. Justice Bradley, in Hans v.
Louisiana, 1 2 said: "The highest authority of this country was
in accord rather with the minority than with the majority of the
court . . . and this fact lends additional interest to the able
opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell on that occasion. The other justices
were more swayed by a close observance of the letter of the Constitution, without regard to former experience and usages-and
because the letter said that the judicial power shall extend to
controversies between a State and citizens of another State, etc.,
they felt constrained to see in this language a power to enable
the individual citizen of one State, or of a foreign State, to sue
another State of the Union in the Federal Courts. Justice
Iredell, on the contrary, contended that it was not the intention
to create new and unheard of remedies by subjecting sovereign
States to actions at the suit of individuals (which he showed
conclusively was never done before), but only, by proper legislation, to invest the Federal Courts with jurisdiction to hear and
determine controversies and cases between the parties designated
that were properly susceptible to litigation in courts. Adhering
to the mere letter it might be so; and so in fact the Supreme
22I34

U. S. 14 (1889).
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Court held in Chisholm v. Georgia, but looking at the subject as
Hamilton and Mr. Justice Iredell did, in the light of history and
experience, and the established order of things, the views of the
latter were clearly right-as the people of the United States
subsequently decided."
Even with the Eleventh Amendment incorporated into the
Constitution, the question of the suability of the States has not
been put at rest, as shown by numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court. The entire ground has been "gone over" in the opinion
of Mr. Justice -Brewer and the dissenting opinion of the present
Chief Justice in South Dakota v. North Carolina.1" Even where
both parties are sovereign States, in the attempt to enforce a
money demand practical difficulties present themselves, as is
manifest from the latest declaration of the court in Virginia v.
14
West Virginia.
In Penhallow v. Doane, 15 Iredell wrote an interesting opinion
in which he discussed the relation which each of the original
colonies bore to each other prior to the formation of the Confederation and the power conferred on the Confederation to
establish Courts of Admiralty, and the effect of the judgments
of such courts in prize cases. It is not practicable to make
extracts from this opinion, but the following is of especial and
permanent interest: "By a State forming a republic I do not
mean the Legislature of the State, the executive of the State or the
judiciary, but all the citizens which compose that State, and are,
if I may so express myself, integral parts of it. . . . In a
republic all the citizens, as such, are equal, and no citizen can
rightfully exercise any authority over another, but in virtue of a
power constitutionally given by the whole community which forms
such body politic."
In Talbot v. Jansen, 16 an interesting question was presented
in regard to the right of expatriation and how it was accomplished. Iredell wrote an opinion in which he discussed the law
s192 U. S. 286.
14221 U. S.
23
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of nations, etc. Upon the right of expatriation and the limitations upon its exercise, the opinion is interesting and enlightening.
In the case of Hylton v. The United States,17 involving the
question whether a tax on carriages was a direct tax, Iredell
wrote a carefully guarded opinion concurring with the other
justices that the tax in question was not a direct tax within the
meaning of the Constitution. He says: "There is no necessity
or propriety in determining what is, or is not, a direct or indirect
tax, in all cases. Some difficulties mAy arise which we do not at
present foresee." His caution has been justified by the history
of the attempt to settle this much vexed question.
At the Spring Term, 1793, of the Circuit Court at Richmond, before Jay, Iredell and District Judge Griffin, the celebrated case of Ware v. Hylton was heard. During the war the
Legislature of Virginia passed an act confiscating the debts of
British subjects and directing the payment of such debts to the
loan office of the State. The defendant, who owed a bond to
the plaintiff, a British subject, had made a partial payment in
accordance with the statute. Suit was brought on the bond. The
defendants were represented by Henry, Marshall, Innis and
Campbell. Iredell writes to Mrs. Iredell, from Richmond, May
27: "We began on the great British cases the second day of the
Court, and are now in the midst of them. The great Patrick
Henry is to speak today. I never was more agreeably disappointed than in my acquaintance with him. I have been much
in his company and his manners are very pleasing and his mind,
I am persuaded, highly liberal. It is a strong additional reason
I have, added to many others, to hold in high detestation violent
party prejudice."
The discussion was one of the most brilliant exhibitions
ever witnessed at the bar of Virginia. Mr. Henry spoke for
three consecutive days. The case was argued upon appeal at the
February Term, 1796, of the Supreme Court. Iredell wrote an
opinion concurring with the majority of the court that the Treaty
I'3 Dallas ITi.
183 Dallas i99.
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of Peace enabled the creditor to sue for the debt, but was of the
opinion (dissenting) that the recovery should be confined to the
amount that had not been paid into the loan office.
Chief Justice Jay having resigned, and the Senate having
refused to confirm the nomination of Judge Rutledge, there was
much speculation as to who would be appointed. Governor Johnston wrote Iredell: "I am sorry that Mr. Cushing refused the office
of Chief Justice, as I don't know whether a less exceptionable
character can be obtained without passing over Mr. Wilson, which
would perhaps be a measure that could not be easily reconciled
to strict neutrality." Iredell writes Mrs. Iredell a few days
after: "Mr. Ellsworth is nominated our Chief Justice in consequence of which I think that Wilson will resign.
The kind expectations of my friends that I might be appointed
Chief Justice were too flattering. Whatever other chance I might
have had there could have been no propriety in passing by judge
Wilson to come at me."
Iredell rode the Middle Circuit during the spring of 1796.
His charge at Philadelphia was published at the -equest of the
grand jury. At the August Term, 1798, in the case of Calder v.
Bull, 19 Iredell set forth very clearly his view respecting the power
of the judiciary to declare invalid acts of the Legislature and the
limitations upon such power. He says: "In a government composed of legislative, executive and judicial departments, established by a constitution which imposed no limits on the legislative
power, the consequence would inevitably be that whatever the
Legislature chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the
judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is
true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative
act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot
think that under such a government any court of justice would
possess the power to declare it so. .
.
It has been the policy
of all the American States, which have individually framed their
State Constitutions, since the Revolution, and of the people of
the United States when they framed the Federal Constitution
to define with precision the objects of the legislative power and
"93 Dallas 386.
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to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If
any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a State, violates
those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though
I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate
and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority,
but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the Legislatures of the Union shall pass a law, within the general scope of
their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be
void, merely because it is in their judgment contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas 6f natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have
differed on the subject; and all that the court could properly say
in such an event would be that the Legislature had passed an act
which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the
principles of natural justice." It is doubtful whether this principle, peculiar to American constitutional law, has been more
accurately stated in any of the discussions which have been had
upon this question.
Judge Iredell rode the Eastern Circuit with Judge Wilson.
He was much pleased with the people of New England, receiving
many courtesies from them. He writes from Boston that he soon
found himself "engaged for every day in the week-sometimes
different invitations on the same day-Judge Lowell has been particularly kind to me." His charge to the grand jury at Boston
was published by request as "Uniting eloquence with exhaustive
knowledge and liberality." From Boston he writes: "I have constantly received distinction and courtesy here, and like Boston
more and more.

.

.

.

it is scarcely possible to meet with a

gentleman who is not a man of education. Such are the advantages of schools of public authority, every township is obliged to
maintain one or more to which poor children can have access without any pay." He writes from Exeter, New Hampshire: "I met
in Boston with a gentleman who lives in Newbury Port, of the
name of Parsons, who appears to me to be the first lawyer I
have met with in America, and is a remarkably agreeable man."
This was Theophilus Parsons, later Chief Justice of Massachusetts. He writes that he had dined with the Committee and
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Corporation of Harvard College, "being seated next to the Lieutenant-Governor, the famous Samuel Adams, who, though an old
man, has a great deal of fire yet. He is polite and agreeable."
On May 27, 1797, Judge Iredell delivered a charge to the

grand jury in Richmond, Virginia, which was "animated, perhaps too warm." At that time the grand jury frequently made
presentment of matters which they regarded as worthy of public
attention, although not the subject of criminal prosecution. They
presented "as a real evil the circular letters of several members
of the last Congress, and particularly letters with the signature
of Samuel J. Cabell endeavoring, at a time of real public danger,
to disseminate unfounded calumnies against the happy Government of the United States, thereby to separate the people therefrom and to increase or produce a foreign -influence ruinous to
the peace, happiness and independence of these United States."
Mr. Cabell made an angry retort, attacking the jury, judge and
the Supreme Court. He proposed to bring the matter before
Congress as a breach of privilege. Mr. Jefferson urged Mr.
Monroe to call it to the attention of the Legislature. Just what
they proposed to do with the jury or the judge does not very
clearly appear. Judge Iredell published a card in which he said
that the charge was prepared before he reached Richmond and
had been delivered in Pennsylvania and Maryland; that he was
not acquainted with Mr. Cabell and knew nothing of the letters
referred to by the grand jury. He concludes, "With regard to
the illiberal epithets Mr. Cabell has bestowed not only upon me,
but on the other judges of the Supreme Court, I leave him in
full possession of all the credit he can derive from the use of
them. I defy him, or any other man, to show that in the exercise of my judicial character I have ever been influenced in the
slightest degree by any man either in or out of office and I assure
him that I shall be as little influenced by this new mode of attack
by a member of Congress, as I can be by any other." The political feeling in the country and especially in Virginia was at that
time very bitter. Governor Johnston, Judge Iredell's brother-inlaw, and always his wise friend, writing him in regard to this
incident, said: "The answer was very proper if proper to give it
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any answer at all." He further said that, which every judge
knows, from experience, to be true, "I am sensible of the difficulties with which a man of warm feelings, and conscious integrity submits to bear, without a reply, unmerited censure; yet I
am not certain but that it is more suitable to the dignity of one
placed in high and respectable departments of state, to consider
himself bound to answer only when called upon constitutionally
before a proper tribunal."
Iredell rode the Southern Circuit during the spring of 1798,
suffering much fatigue and discomfort. At the February Term,
1799, of the Supreme Court, he sat for the last time. He filed
"one of his best and most carefully written opinions" concurring
with the conclusion reached by the other Judges in Sims v.
Irvine.20 He held the Circuit Court at Philadelphia at which
term several of the insurgents were on trial for treason. In his
last charge to the grand jury he dwelt at much length on the law
of treason and the Alien and Sedition laws. It is manifest that
Iredell, as were many others, was deeply impressed with the belief
that French philosophy and infidelity, coupled with the revolutionary proceedings in that country, were finding defenders in
America, seriously threatening the peace of the country and the
dissolution of the Union. He was a Federalist and joined with
the members of that party in their reverence for Washington,
sustaining his administration. He disliked and distrusted the
French leaders and their principles. His charge was filled with
warning against the influence of principles and conduct, which,
in his opinion, were involving the American people in the French
revolution, and the disturbed relations of that country with
England. His concluding words in his last charge to a grand
jury are interesting and illustrative of the condition of his
mind. He says: "If you suffer this government to be destroyed
what chance have you for any other? A scene of the most
dreadful confusion must ensue. Anarchy will ride triumphant,
and all lovers of order, decency, truth and justice be
trampled under foot. May that God whose peculiar province
seems often to have interposed to save these United States
3 Dallas 425.
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from destruction, preserve us from this worst of all evils,
and may the inhabitants of this happy country deserve His care
and protection by a conduct best calculated to obtain them."
The grand jury, requesting the publication of the charge, say:
"At a time like the present when false philosophy and wicked
principles are spreading with rapidity under the imposing garb of
liberty over the fairest country of the old world, we are convinced that the publication of a charge fraught with such clear
and just observations on the nature and operation 9 f the Constitution and laws of the United States will be highly beneficial to
the citizens thereof." As an illustration of the condition of
public sentiment, Governor Johnston writes Iredell who, having
concluded the trials in Philadelphia had come to Richmond, "I.
am glad that you have got away from the land of treason to the
land of sedition-the change is somethirg for the better." Chief
Justice Ellsworth, riding the Southern Circuit, writes Iredell
from Raleigh, N. C., June 10, 1799: "My opinion, collected

from some gentlemen who have b.en lately traveling in that State,
(Virginia), and others who were at the Petersburg races, presents
a melancholy picture of that country. These gentlemen returned
with a firm conviction that the leaders there were determined
upon the overthrow of the general government.

.

.

That

.

the submission and assistance of North Carolina was counted on
'as a matter of course." The Chief Justice, however, adds: "As
it was shortly after the election, these may have been the momentary effusions of disappointed ambition."
Thirty years of constant and wearing work, coupled with
the climate in which he lived and the long journeys on the Southern Circuit, which he rode four times in five years, had impaired
Judge Iredell's health. He was unable to attend the August
Term, 1799, of the Court. His illness increased until on October
2 th, 1799, at his home in Edenton, he passed away, in the forty-

ninth year of his age. His friend, the Rt. Rev. Charles Pettigrew, testified of him: "In the run of above twenty years I have
often heard high encomiums on the merits of this great and good
man; but never in a single instance, have I heard his character
traduced, or his integrity called in question."
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His biographer-from whose excellent work I have largely
drawn in the preparation of this sketch-says that with Judge
Iredell's papers is an original "Treatise on Evidence," "an
S..Essay
on the Law of Pleading," and one on the "Doctrine of the Laws of England concerning Real Property so far
as it is in use or force in the State of North Carolina," the two
last unfinished.
When it is remembered that he came to America at seventeen
years of age-with neither wealth nor family influence-that his
opportunities and sources of study Were limited by the condition
of the country, that for seven of the thirty years of his life here
the country was engaged in war, we can in some degree appreciate the immense labor which he performed and the results which
he accomplished. His life is a tribute to the teaching and example
of his parents-the influence of those with whom he was brought
into association in his adopted home-his industry, talents,
patriotism, and lofty principles of honor and integrity.
Judge Iredell left one son, bearing his name, who became a
lawyer of learning and distinction, Judge of the Superior Court,
Governor, and United States Senator. He was for many years
Reporter of the Supreme Court of the State and author of an
excellent work on "The Law of Executors." He died during the
year of 1853. His descendants are among the most honorable,
useful, and patriotic citizens of the State.
It has been the purpose of this sketch to set forth, in the
space which could be allotted, a short survey of the judicial work
of Judge Iredell. His early death cut short a career on the Bench,
full of promise of enlarging scope and usefulness. That he would
have continued to develop his high judicial qualities and, if permitted, shared with the "Great Chief Justice" the work of laying
deep and strong the foundations of American Constitutional Law
cannot be doubted. His opinions upon Constitutional questions
evince a very high order of judicial statesmanship.
H. G. Connor.
Wilson, N. C.

